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Why are poorer countries  nding it so hard to get hold of vaccines? Export restrictions are
key pieces in the puzzle, say Ralf Peters and Divya Prabhakar (UNCTAD), and will require
serious consideration at the World Trade Organization.
Brazil, India, Laos, Nepal, Peru, Thailand: new and even more catastrophic waves of COVID-
19 have hit the developing world. On top of this, the world is also witnessing another
phenomenon – vaccine nationalism. Come summer, wealthy nations are beginning to return
to normal, while the rest of the world continues the struggle to vaccinate its population.
Many are eyeing the G7 countries, who are set to meet in June, to lead the way to vaccine
equity.  But two questions persist: why are vaccines not reaching everyone, and what can we
do about it?
As the pharmaceutical powerhouse of the world and a key supplier of the COVAX initiative,
India was poised to help a great number of developing and least developed countries by
supplying COVID vaccines. However, facing a catastrophic second wave itself, it has not only
stopped exporting vaccines, but is now beginning to import them. The implications of this
could be severe, particularly for poorer countries that were depending on India. The ripple
effects would hit the most vulnerable countries the hardest, leaving them behind in the
respective vaccination drives. The WHO has already warned of a new wave in Africa, where
vaccine imports have slowed down since India stopped exporting. But it is not just India.
Other vaccine producing countries like the US and the European Union have imposed
restrictions on exports of vaccines and critical raw materials needed for its production. This
is despite having already hoarded over 60% of the world’s vaccines before they were even
approved for use. These developed countries comprise no more than 20% of world’s
population.
Figure 1: COVID-19 vaccine doses administered per 100 people, 10 June, 2021
The production of vaccines is highly concentrated, mainly in a small number of higher and
middle-income countries. The necessary raw materials, too, are imported from only a
handful of countries. The two top exporters of key ingredients, for instance, are the US and
the EU – which account for half of total exports – followed by the UK, Japan and China, with
signi cantly smaller shares. This implies that restrictions on exports of vaccines or other
critical raw material and equipment by even one or two countries can easily send
shockwaves through the rest of the world, derailing the entire vaccine production and
distribution effort, as we see at present.
This is a huge moral failure on the part of the global
community
Export restrictions are not exclusive to vaccines. Over 80 countries had resorted to banning
exports of medical and personal protective goods in the early phases of the pandemic. This
too had severe supply chain implications. Nearly 60% of these curbs are still in place.
Figure 2: Trade measures (December 2019 – March 2021)
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Ultimately, these export restrictions may come back to bite the countries who imposed
them. As the virus continues to mutate, it may render vaccines ineffective and the already
vaccinated less immune. The global economy, too, will not revive until everyone is
vaccinated, since lockdowns and social distancing norms in key manufacturing locations
continue to curtail global trade. Besides, this is a huge moral failure on the part of the global
community.
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The subject of export restrictions should be tackled at the WTO. The pandemic should serve
as both a reference and a turning point. Reviving the debate around emergency export bans
should form a key part of the WTO reform agenda. The current rules allow for temporary
export restrictions or prohibitions to prevent or relieve critical shortages of essential
products, provided all measures are communicated, have phase out timelines and are
proportionate to the scale of the problem at hand. But who decides what constitutes
proportionate, and what timeline is reasonable?
Export restrictions are sometimes seen as a necessary instrument to ensure popular
acceptance of multilateral trade agreements. The latter is important. However, open markets
do not  t with sudden export restrictions during a pandemic. It is perhaps time for stricter
rules on essential goods, which can ensure transparency through more effective monitoring
and review of members states’ trade policies during emergencies. Some sort of
“compulsory” provisions to ensure that dependent countries’ interests are accounted for in
emergency situations should be agreed upon. The declaration of a pandemic by the WHO
could be one objective trigger for the state of emergency, a declaration by the FAO of a food
shortage another.
The global community needs to present a united front
now so that everyone is equally prepared in future crises
A recent UN Policy Brief calls for an agreement not to impose export restrictions on
essential foodstuffs destined for food-de cit developing countries during an emergency
situation. Achieving full transparency through strengthened noti cations is a relatively low
hanging fruit, but already an important measure. Special and differential treatment
provisions, without much wriggle room for major exporters, should be emphasised. The
global community needs to present a united front now so that everyone is equally prepared
in future crises.
Outside the WTO, national governments and the private sector will have to reduce their over-
reliance on a small number of manufacturing sites for vaccines or other pharmaceutical
goods, which, as the pandemic has shown, can be quite costly. In 2019, close to 40% of
registered manufacturing sites for active pharmaceutical ingredients were located in India
and China. Germany, the United States, and Switzerland supply 35% of medical products.
Creating new, more decentralised supply chains should be the new post-pandemic mantra.
Many developing countries, particularly in Africa, need to curb their over reliance on imports
for pharmaceuticals, and set up their own capacity.
This post represents the views of the authors and not those of the COVID-19 blog, nor LSE,
nor the United Nations nor its member states.
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